Myanmar's President Min Aung Hlaing is pressing ahead on two fronts simultaneously -- the battlefield and diplomacy. For the latter, the Myanmar president and former junta leader aims to secure a return to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) fold by the next summit in November. Whether he succeeds will depend on the bloc's overall verdict.
Asean leaders have already delivered a blunt message to the new military-backed regime, calling for "meaningful progress" that, for Asean leaders, is the meaningful implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), the regional framework adopted in 2021 to resolve the Myanmar crisis. No more dilly-dallying.
At the Asean Summit in Cebu last month, leaders were united in their assessment that Myanmar has made little progress over the past five years in implementing the 5PC. Despite persistent criticism of the framework, all Asean member states continue to support it as the most viable option available. The worst outcome, leaders agreed, would be to abandon Nay Pyi Taw -- a move that will open doors to outside powers.
Since establishing a new government in early April, following much-condemned elections, President Min Aung Hlaing has moved quickly to build diplomatic support among neighbouring countries and across Asean. It must be said that, as Nay Pyi Taw tries to return to the global community, the government continues its aerial attacks on resistance strongholds, which continue unabated. International organisations, including UN agencies, have condemned the ongoing atrocities against civilians.
Nay Pyi Taw's strategy has two tracks. First, the Tatmadaw will continue military operations to recapture territory lost since Operation 1027 in October 2023 while pursuing parallel peace talks in the capital. Nay Pyi Taw wants to strengthen its leverage as much as possible. It recently held talks with seven ethnic armed organisations that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. A July 31 deadline has been set for armed groups wishing to enter peace negotiations.
Last week, the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) revealed during an informal meeting with Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signatory Ethnic Armed Organisations (NCA-SEAOs) that the regime is preparing to propose 43 constitutional amendments to parliament. Discussions focused on easing conditions for the peace process, establishing sequential working mechanisms and enforcing an unconditional ceasefire.
Despite these overtures, major resistance groups have rejected the framework. The Supreme Council of Ethnic Armed Organisations, the main resistance umbrella body, has convened its own meetings, held diplomatic briefings and projected unity. Resistance commanders, however, have acknowledged that they are not gaining new ground.
Since Cebu, Asean members and Myanmar have also stepped up bilateral engagement. Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow was the first Asean leader to visit Nay Pyi Taw in early April, shortly after the new government was inaugurated. On May 19, Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan made a one-day visit to the capital city. It must be noted that Mr Mohamad received a lukewarm reception and did not meet President Min Aung Hlaing. Lest we forget, Malaysia became one of the most outspoken Asean members against Myanmar's military regime.
Upon returning to Kuala Lumpur, Mr Mohamad said he saw "positive developments" in the Myanmar authorities' attitude toward finding a political solution to the conflict. He added that officials appeared more willing to discuss peace and bring different parties to the table. His visit was followed by that of Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono in early June. Indonesia's stance toward Myanmar's military junta since the 2021 coup is generally seen as one of the most active and diplomacy-driven within Asean.
The contrast in reception was telling. Mr Sugiono received a red-carpet welcome and met both Min Aung Hlaing and Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe. He said Indonesia continued to regard Myanmar as an integral part of Asean. He also reaffirmed Indonesia's commitment to providing the assistance needed to help Myanmar become a peaceful and successful nation.
State media gave Mr Sugiono's visit front-page and prime-time coverage. Mr Mohamad fared differently. He met only his counterpart, Tin Maung Swe, while state media relegated the visit to a brief item on an inside page of the Global New Light of Myanmar. Lao Foreign Minister Thongsavanh Phomvihane also visited Nay Pyi Taw last week.
In response, the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) held meetings and briefings for Bangkok-based diplomats and international organisations. The SCEF was formed by the National Unity Government and ethnic armed groups to fight the military junta and build a federal democratic system.
Following the election, Nay Pyi Taw hoped that its senior political officials would be able to participate in all Asean meetings, particularly the upcoming Asean-Russia Summit in Kazan, Russia, from June 17-19, marking the 35th anniversary of dialogue relations.
When Asean senior officials agreed earlier this year to Russia's request for the summit, the bloc assumed that Myanmar, as Asean's country coordinator for Russia, would continue to follow the restricted protocol established in 2021 of allowing only non-political representatives to attend.
Although Moscow announced the Kazan summit in February, Asean initially remained uncertain about the format, with some member states floating Manila as an alternative venue. Moscow further complicated matters when President Vladimir Putin invited Min Aung Hlaing to join the summit. Asean's position was clear -- the restriction barred the newly elected president from participating. Fortunately, Beijing announced on Thursday that Min Aung Hlaing would visit China from June 15-19, overlapping with the Kazan summit. The China trip provides an exit strategy for all parties.
In Cebu, a Thai proposal to allow Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe to meet his Asean counterparts in person was debated but failed to gain consensus. Asean foreign ministers agreed on the need to re-engage Myanmar, as advocated by Mr Sihasak, but insisted that any engagement must come at the right time and under the right conditions. In that sense, Kazan became a test of political will. Asean remains firm.
The Asean chair and Thailand are working together to ensure that inclusive political dialogue makes progress in the months ahead. In mid-July, ahead of the annual Asean Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Asean ministers are expected to meet in Bangkok and later hold talks with Myanmar stakeholders in Chiang Mai.
Obviously, the new regime's overriding goal is to rejoin the 49th Asean Summit in November. Nay Pyi Taw understands the stakes. Singapore assumes the Asean chairmanship next year and has long maintained one of the bloc's toughest positions on Myanmar. Having already given up its turn as Asean chair in 2026, Nay Pyi Taw would like to reclaim its place in the rotation in 2029, following Thailand's chairmanship in 2028. Timor-Leste, however, has already reiterated its intention to assume the chair that year.
Asean, for its part, continues to insist on implementing the 5PC. China, India, Russia and others may engage the Min Aung Hlaing government on their own terms, but Asean is moving at its own pace -- deliberate and unyielding. The question that will define the next five months is straightforward -- will it be the Asean Way or the Myanmar Way? The ball is in Nay Pyi Taw's court.
Kavi Chongkittavorn is a veteran journalist on regional affairs.
