From Allen v. Noble, decided last week by Judge Latonia Williams (Conn. Super. Ct. New Haven), plaintiff's factual allegations (for Noble's side of the story, as to the now-dropped criminal charges against her apparently based on the same incident, see this N.Y. Post op-ed—she denies that she used slurs, and claims that surveillance video footage shows "[n]o confrontation, not even any interaction, with the accuser" [UPDATE: see below for the transcript of the hearing where the prosecutors dropped the charges]):
[P]laintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff is an American citizen of African descent, who, during the times alleged in the complaint, was employed as a parking lot attendant for Pro-Park Mobility. The defendant Noble, during the times alleged in the complaint, was the executive director, employee, and agent for service of process of the defendant Buckley Institute. On or about a date prior to July 6, 2023, one or both of the defendants entered into an agreement with the plaintiff's employer to rent parking spaces for one or more of Buckley Institute's employees, including Noble, in the parking lot where the plaintiff works as an attendant (parking lot).
The complaint alleges that on or about July 6, 2023, while the plaintiff was at the parking lot, he informed Noble that the lot was full and he could not provide for her parking needs. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff overheard Noble state, "fucking niggers," and that the plaintiff did not respond to her.
The complaint further alleges that on July 13, 2023, while the plaintiff was on duty within the parking lot, Noble told him she could not find a parking place in the parking lot and the plaintiff said the parking lot was full and could not accommodate her. The complaint alleges that Noble replied: "You's niggers get jobs and don't know how to act!," and that the plaintiff did not respond to her.
The complaint further alleges that on or about July 27, 2023, the plaintiff observed Noble arrive at the parking lot and found that, due to the lot being full, there was no space within the parking lot to park her car. The complaint alleges that at that time, in the presence of, and within the earshot of two individuals and the plaintiff, Noble orally referred to the plaintiff as a "nigger" three times over a parking lot issue.
The complaint states that "[t]he plaintiff, by dint of … Noble's racially odious, racially demeaning, cruel, abhorrent, and racist epithets towards … [the plaintiff] had the capacity to hold him up to public ridicule, public humiliation, and has caused him great annoyance, embarrassment, shame, degradation, and moreover, he has suffered in his reputation and has lost the good will of many persons with which he otherwise would have enjoyed by dint of … Noble's heinous and foul misconduct she directed towards him." …
The court allowed plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to go forward:
"In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under … [IIED], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." "Liability for [IIED] requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society …. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community…. Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon [IIED]."
"Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine…. Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury." "[I]n assessing a claim for [IIED], the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint… set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on [IIED]." …
In general, "courts have been more apt to find sufficient allegations of outrageous conduct when that conduct involves violence, the threat of violence, or racial, ethnic, sexual, or religious slurs…. Lamothe v. Russell (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009) (supervisor constantly belittled, berated, and screamed at the plaintiff, constantly mocked plaintiff by calling her fat, threw objects at or near plaintiff, and, on at least one occasion in front of others, grabbed a cigarette out of plaintiff's mouth and/or hands, while screaming at her); Leone v. New England Communications (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) (owners subjected plaintiff to constant ethnic slurs, sexually offensive comments, sexually offensive pictures placed on plaintiff's computer, and insulting comments on his sexual preference)." Cortazar v. Staples the Office Superstore (Conn. Super. Ct. 2012)….
With respect to the specific word at issue in this case, our Supreme Court [in State v. Lienbenguth (2020)] provides an in-depth discussion of the highly offensive and demeaning nature of the use of the word "nigger." The court states:
Not only is the word "nigger" undoubtedly the most hateful and inflammatory racial slur in the contemporary American lexicon; …; but it is probably the single most offensive word in the English language. See, e.g., Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) ("[The] epithet ['nigger'] has been labeled, variously, a term that 'sums up … all the bitter years of insult and struggle in America,' [L. Hughes, The Big Sea: An Autobiography], 'pure anathema to African-Americans,' Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass (4th Cir. 2001), and 'probably the most offensive word in English.' [Random House Webster's College Dictionary]. See generally [A. Haley, Roots: The Saga of an American Family]; [H. Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird]…. No other word in the English language so powerfully or instantly calls to mind our country's long and brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination against African-Americans."); R. Kennedy, The David C. Baum Lecture: 'Nigger!' as a Problem in the Law, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 935 (although "[t]he American language is (and has long been) rife with terms of ethnic, racial, and national insult: kike, mick, wop, nip, gook, honkie, wetback, chink, [etc.] … 'nigger is now probably the most offensive word in English'"); Dictionary.com, available at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/nigger?s=t ("The term nigger is now probably the most offensive word in English. Its degree of offensiveness has increased markedly in recent years, although it has been used in a derogatory manner since at least the Revolutionary War.").
In fact, because of the racial prejudice and oppression with which it is forever inextricably linked, the word "nigger," when used by a white person as an assertion of the racial inferiority of an African-American person, "is more than [a] mere offensive utterance …. No word … is as odious or loaded with as terrible a history." … "[T]he term is generally regarded as virtually taboo because of the legacy of racial hatred that underlies the history of its use among whites" …. "[N]o fact is more generally known than that a white man who calls a black man a 'nigger' within his hearing will hurt and anger the black man and often provoke him to confront the white man and retaliate. The trial court was free to judicially note this fact."). The word being "one of insult, abuse and belittlement harking back to slavery days"; it is uniquely "expressive of racial hatred and bigotry"; and "degrading and humiliating in the extreme …." For all these reasons, the word rightly has been characterized as "the most provocative, emotionally-charged and explosive term in the [English] language."
In the present case, Noble allegedly referred to the plaintiff as a "nigger" multiple times, on three different days. Thus, for purposes of the motion to strike, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support the extreme and outrageous element.
The defendants further argue that the plaintiff fails to allege facts that, if proven true, would show that the plaintiff has suffered "severe" mental distress. Here again, the court disagrees. "The distress necessary to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been defined simply, but clearly, as 'mental distress of a very serious kind.'" Count two alleges "severe" emotional distress. The severity of the distress is to be determined by the evidence of its intensity and duration in future proceedings; thus, the cases relied on by the defendants involving summary judgment do not assist the court in determining the sufficiency of the allegations…. Whether the plaintiff suffered "severe" mental distress is for a finder of fact to determine.
But the court rejected plaintiff's other claims. As to his slander claim, it reasoned that the slur did "not assert objective fact, but only an opinion." As to the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, it reasoned (among other things) that that tort applied to a narrow set of cases involving risk of illness or bodily harm. It similarly rejected the claims for negligence and for "wanton and reckless conduct," which generally require a risk of bodily harm. And it rejected an unfair competition claim, in part because it is limited to conduct within business relationships:
The supplemental objection argues that Noble's statements occurred during conduct of trade and commerce by way of the defendant's use of the lot while going to and from work. The plaintiff reasons that the claim is satisfied because one of Noble's responsibilities is to show up to work for business and events, and the defendants lease the parking space from the plaintiff's employer; thus, they are engaged in trade or commerce with the parking lot.
However, the plaintiff has failed to provide the court with any binding authority that Noble's act of parking a car in the lot leased by Buckley Institute and/or Noble creates an action in trade or commerce by Noble. "[A]ctivities constitute trade or commerce only if the party is engaged in the business of conducting such activities." The complaint fails to sufficiently allege that Noble was engaged in trade or commerce.
UPDATE 5/21/26, 11:21 am: The Buckley Institute passed along a copy of the transcript in the criminal case against Noble; here's a long excerpt from the prosecutor's explanation of why the charges were dropped:
Today the State is entering a nolle based on the sole reason that the State cannot prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The reasons we cannot prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt are there is insufficient evidence to support—support the complaining witness claim; there are inconsistencies in the complaining witness' statements; there are credibility issues; there are—there exists video evidence clearly contradicting the complaining witness' statements; and there is a possibility that this defendant may not be the correct offender based upon the absence of a positive identification procedure.
Factually, the State cannot meet its burden, and as prosecutors we have an ethical obligation not to pursue charges that cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, an obligation that the State takes very seriously.
The allegations here involve the complaining witness who was working as a parking attendant at Propark Parking at the Wall Street lot. And he alleged that this defendant made racist comments to him on three separate occasions. Those dates were July 6th, 2023, July 13th, 2023, and July 27th, 2023.
In regards to the July 6th date, the complaining witness said in a written statement that he was working as a pro—for Propark as a parking attendant when the defendant was attempting to park in the lot; that the complaining witness told her that the parking lot was full. The complaining witness said he heard the defendant say a racist slur towards him once he informed her that there was no parking available at this time.
Later he gave a statement that was captured on body-worn camera. And at that time the complaining witness said that the defendant pulled up to the lot and noticed the lot was full and then uttered a racial slur before flying out of the parking lot.
There are several inconsistencies with the complainant's allegations in regards to the July 6 statement. The State obtained video evidence of the parking lot on July 6th, 2023 which clearly shows two blue SUVs pull into the parking lot at similar times. One is the defendant's SUV and the other individual is driving a blue SUV is also a white woman, like the defendant. The parking lot is clearly not full as the complaining witness alleged in his statements. The defendant parks her vehicle, exits the parking lot walking with absolutely no interaction with the complaining—complaining witness. The defendant does not drive out of the parking lot as the complaining witness alleges, but clearly parks in a lot that is not full, gets out of her car, and walks out of the parking lot.
On this date, the complaining witness has an interaction with another woman who was also a white woman, like the defendant and drives a blue SUV. When the State interviewed the complaining witness, he had first said maybe he got the date wrong, and then he said, no, I'm sure it was July 6th because my sister's birthday is July 7th.
Complaining witness never said he may be unsure about the date or did—he did not give a range of dates. He always said it was July 6th, July 13th, and July 27th. Complaining witness also is inconsistent as to what happened in his written statement and his recorded statement on body-worn camera. It seems he flipped what is said on July 6th and on July 13th.
During complaining witness's interview with the State, he also said he had just started working a few days prior to the July 6th date and didn't know who all the people were who were parking their cars in the lot. He also stated, so around this time I was just starting and I don't know who was who.
The complaining witness also said the defendant's car pulled in the lot around 10:30, 11 on July 6th and clearly on video, the car pulls into the lot at 9:13 a.m.
In regards to the July 13th allegations, that's July 13th, 2023. Again, the complaining witness gave a written statement and stated that defendant's vehicle was blocked in by another vehicle the previous day on July 12th. And there was no verbal argument on that day.
He then stated on July 13th, 2023 defendant's vehicle was again blocked in and they had a verbal argument. Complainant blamed the defendant for her vehicle being blocked in and again uttered a racial slur towards the complaining witness.
In a later statement captioned on body-worn camera, the complainant says defendant approached his booth to complain about being blocked in the day before by another car and then uttered a racial slur.
Again, the State was able to obtain video of the July 13th, 2023 date. The video clearly shows defendant's car pull into the lot at 9:06 a.m. and her windows are up and she parks her vehicle. The complaining witness is seen walking away from the area of the defendant's vehicle and there's absolutely no interaction between the two parties. Defendant parks her vehicle, the lot is not full as the complaining witness alleges, and exits—she exits the church parking lot. Defendant never, on the video, approaches the booth where the complaining witness is located.
The third date in question is July 27th, 2023. On this date, the complaining witness' supervisor, Misty Doss was assisting with the parking lot because there was an event that was being held that day. The complaining witness said he saw defendant coming and told Misty of his previous problems with the defendant. The complainant said he was nearby when Misty approached the defendant to tell her that her vehicle may be blocked in to an event—due to an event today.
The complaining witness said he heard defendant say to Misty, referring to him by a racial slur and that Misty said, it's the rules of the lot, and then the defendant then again uttered a racial slur toward the complaining witness.
Misty Doss gave a statement captured on body-worn cam about the July 27th, 2023 interaction. She said she approached the defendant and asked her for—for her car keys and that the defendant was furious and started insulting her. She stated that they had a heated argument and defendant stomped her foot. Misty said that the defendant then referred to the complaining witness by a racial slur and said that he better not touch her car while the complaining witness was a car-and-a-half length away talking to another customer.
Again, the State obtained video evidence of the July 27th, 2023 allegation. The interaction between the defendant and Misty is captured on video but defendant does not stomp her foot or point in any direction. In fact, you cannot even see the complaining witness on the video when the defendant and Misty interact.
Police reports state that Misty told the police, quote, Noble, referring to the defendant did not point or direct at any—any of the berating towards Allen at any time; Allen is the complaining witness. This is inconsistent with the complaining witness' statement.
Again, there was no interaction on this date between this defendant and the complaining witness. The complaining witness also alleged that another witness by the name of William Henton was a witness to the July 27th interaction. He was in the parking lot that day, according to the complaining witness, fixing his vehicle and overheard the interaction.
Again, the State reviewed body-worn camera—I'm sorry.—video footage, not body-worn camera footage from this date and this individual is not on video fixing his car at the time that the defendant and Misty had their interaction.
In addition to these factual inconsistencies, there is an issue regarding the identification of the defendant as the individual who allegedly uttered these racial slurs. The complaining witness has said on multiple occasions that he started working a few days prior to the July 26th, 2023 date and he was unsure of who was who.
Complainant does have what appears to be an altercation with a white woman who drives a dark SUV similar to defendants on the first date, but this is not the defendant. Additionally, there was never an identification procedure where the complaining witness was asked to identify the alleged individual who uttered—uttered these racial slurs.
There also exists potential Brady and Giglio material on complaining witness's telephone which the complainant has said repeatedly doesn't exist, although the State has reason to believe it does exist based on the complaining witness statements captured on police officer body-worn camera.
The State also takes its Brady and Giglio obligations seriously and this is just one of the many reasons why the State cannot proceed with this prosecution….
So in conclusion, I'd just like to state that the allegations made by the complainant are serious and the State has taken these allegations quite seriously. We did a thorough investigation into this—these allegations. And after that thorough investigation, the State has concluded that these allegations cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And therefore, today we are entering a nolle on all charges….
And here's an excerpt from Mr. Allen's statement at the hearing:
So I know the prosecutor, excuse me.—mentioned that on the 27th I had an altercation with another young lady. It wasn't an altercation; it was discussing about where she could park and where she couldn't park. I don't know if she's seen the video. I have the video. Yes. I've been—had the video with my attorney.
Same video, another video that I have with Miss Nolles (as said) and my supervisor getting into it, I have that video as well. So when she said I got into it with someone it was—I didn't know who I was talking to or who I was arguing with, 'cause clearly I—I can tell. The young lady I was talking to was shorter, didn't have glasses. Miss Nolles was taller with glasses.
I mean, everyday people have a bad day, wonderful days, great days, some people, but when you have a bad day you shouldn't take it out on someone else based on whatever situation is going on that day.
Just like what I told my attorney, and I told the—and the prosecutor, I didn't know Miss Nolles. I didn't know a lot of people at the parking lot, I was still feeling people out. But at the end of the day, it was a little issue on I had this day right, this day wrong, whatever the case is, just like when we watched the video, if you watched the video, once it starts playing, it starts jumping. Some things you see, some things you don't see. Just like was mentioned at her car, Miss Nolles—excuse me.—Miss Nolles' car was already in the parking lot on a particular day. But it was—oh, Nobles. I apologize. Miss Nobles, on a particular day.
Clearly the video that I have doesn't show that her car was even in the parking lot; it was a whole entire different SUV. She has a blue Mercedes, this was a blue Audi. Two different cars.
But again, like I said, you know, you got to make a decision based on how you feel or your burden of proof or not proof but, you know racism is born every day….
And an excerpt from the statement by Mr. Allen's lawyer:
With respect to the last date in question, that'll be July 27th. In addition to one independent witness, Misty Doss, there was also a Mr. William Henton who is the head sexton at United Church of Christ on the Green here in New Haven that owns the parking lot. He was there that day. That information was made available to the police as well as to the prosecutor.
So, I think that if a jury has problems with two of the dates that are in question where there is no independent witness, perhaps they wouldn't with the third….
Of course, the dropping of the criminal charges doesn't legally preclude the civil case from going forward: That a prosecutor thought the case can't be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (the criminal standard) doesn't prevent a jury concluding that the case can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence (the civil standard). But presumably the same video evidence will be introduced at the civil trial as well, and the jury can draw their conclusions from it (as well as the other evidence).
Note, by the way, that I spoke at a Buckley Institute event last Fall, and was paid a modest honorarium. The event had nothing to do with this case, and nothing to do with this post. (Naturally, I'm generally happy to add updates with further information, such as court transcripts, relevant to my posts, regardless of whether I had dealt with the organization before or not.)
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